The covers of the following books are not yet photographed
Historia, Le cas Violette Nozière, Paris, Historia, 1978.
Historia, Fantômes et maisons hantées, Paris, Historia, 1977.
Historia, 50 bombes "A" sur la Chine?, Paris, Historia, 1978.
Historia, Des Francs-Maçons célèbres, Paris, Historia, 1978.
Historia, Les Staliniens Français, Paris, Historia, 1976.
Historia, Les dossiers noirs du Parti Communiste, Paris, Historia, 1976.
Historia, La reine blanche, Paris, Historia, 1978.
Historia, Les morts mystérieuses, Paris, Historia, 1976.
HISTORIA, Historia Special. An 1000-an 2000. Le tournants d'une civilisation, France, Histroria, 1999.
NN (HISTORIA), Historia de No 351 à 356, février - juillet 1976, Paris, Librairie Jules Tallandier, 1976.
NN (HISTORIA), Historia de No 357 à 362, août 1976 - janvier 1977, Paris, Librairie Jules Tallandier, 1977.
NN (HISTORIA), Historia de No 339 à 344, février - juillet 1975, Paris, Librairie Jules Tallandier, 1975.
NN (HISTORIA), Historia de No 369 à 374, août 1977 - janvier 1978, Paris, Librairie Jules Tallandier, 1978.
NN (HISTORIA), Historia de No 345 à 350, août 1975 - janvier 1976, Paris, Librairie Jules Tallandier, 1976.
NN (HISTORIA), Historia de No 363 à 368, février - juillet 1977, Paris, Librairie Jules Tallandier, 1977.
March 14, 2016
Excerpt of an article originally published under the title "Latest Survey Finds 25% of French Teenagers Are Muslims."
One of the most striking cases of reality denial in contemporary France is demography: issues like birthrate, life expectancy, immigration, and emigration. On the face of it, you can hardly ignore such things, since they constantly reshape your environment and your way of life. Even without resorting to statistics, you are bound to perceive, out of day-to-day experience, what the current balance is between younger and older people, how many kids are to be found at an average home, and the ethnicity or religion of your neighbors, or the people you relate to at work or in business.
The French elites, both on the right and left, managed for five decades at least to dismiss the drastic demographic changes that had been taking place in their country, including the rise of Islam, since they clashed with too many political concepts – or fantasies – they had been brainwashed into accepting: the superiority of the "French social model;" the unique assimilative capacity of French society; equality for equality's sake; the primacy of individual values over family values; secularism; francophonie, or the assumption that all French-speaking nations in the world were a mere extension of France, and that all nations that defined themselves as "Francophone" did speak French or were subdued by French culture; and finally la politique arabe et islamique de la France, a supposed political and strategic affinity with the Arab and Muslim world.
Until 2004, compilation of ethnic, racial, and religious statistics was prohibited under French law.
One way for the elites to deny demographics was to reject ethnic-related investigation on legal or ethical grounds. Until 2004, ethnic, racial, and religious statistics were not allowed under French law – ostensibly to prevent a return of Vichy State-style racial persecutions. Even as the law was somehow relaxed, first in 2004 and again in 2007, many statisticians or demographers insisted on retaining a de facto ban on such investigations.
The issue turned into a nasty civil war among demographers, and especially within INED (the French National Institute for Demographic Studies) between a "classic" wing led by older demographers like Henri Léridon and Gérard Calot and then by the younger Michèle Tribalat, and a liberal or radical wing led by Hervé Le Bras.
In a recent interview with the French weekly Le Point, Tribalat dryly observed that the "well-connected" Le Bras described her as "the National Front Darling," an assertion that "destroyed her professional reputation." The son of a prestigious Catholic historian, Le Bras is indeed a very powerful man in his own right, who managed throughout his own career to accumulate tenures, honors, and positions of influence both in France and abroad.
The irony about his accusation against Tribalat is that, while intent to discuss the issue of immigration, she is an extremely cautious and conservative expert when it comes to actual figures. She has always tended to play down, in particular, the size of the French Muslim community.
In 1997, I observed in an essay for Middle East Quarterly that figures about French Islam were simply chaotic: there was too much discrepancy between sources:
The Ministry of Interior and Ined routinely speak of a Muslim population in France of 3 million. Sheikh Abbas, head of the Great Mosque in Paris, in 1987 spoke of twice as many – 6 million. Journalists usually adopt an estimate somewhere in the middle: for example, Philippe Bernard of Le Monde uses the figure of 3 to 4 million. The Catholic Church, a reliable source of information on religious trends in France, also estimates 4 million. Arabies, a French-Arab journal published in Paris, provides the following breakdown: 3.1 million Muslims of North African origin, 400,000 from the Middle East, 300,000 from Africa, 50,000 Asians, 50,000 converts of ethnic French origin, and 300,000 illegal immigrants from unknown countries. This brings the total to 4.2 million. One can state with reasonable certainty that the Muslim population of France numbers over 3 million (about 5 percent of the total French population) and quite probably over 4 million (6.6 percent).
Nineteen years later, accuracy has hardly improved in this respect. All sources agree that France as a whole underwent a moderate demographic growth: from 57 to 67 million, a 15% increase. (Throughout the same period of time, the U.S. enjoyed a 22% population increase, and China, under a government-enforced one-child policy, a 27% increase.) All sources agree also that there was a much sharper increase in French Muslim demographics – and that, accordingly, the moderate national growth may in fact just reflect the Muslim growth.
For all that, however, there are still no coherent figures about the Muslim community. According to CSA, a pollster that specializes in religious surveys, 6% of the citizens and residents of France identified with Islam in 2012: about 4 million people out of 65 million. IFOP, a leading national pollster, settled for 7% in 2011: 4.5 million. Pew concluded in 2010 a figure of 7.5%: 4.8 million. The CIA World Factbook mentioned 7% to 9% in 2015: from 4.6 to almost 6 million out of 66 million. INED claimed as early as 2009 an 8% figure: 5.1 million. Later, INED and French government sources gave 9% in 2014: 5.8 million.
Over two decades, the French Muslim population is thus supposed to have increased by 25% according to the lowest estimations, by 50% according to median estimations, or even by 100% if one compares the INED and government figures of 1997 to those of 2014, from 3 million to almost 6 million.
This is respectively almost two times, three times, or six times the French average population growth.
An impressive leap forward, whatever the estimation. But even more impressive is, just as was the case in 1997, the discrepancy between the estimates. Clearly, one set of estimates, at least, must be entirely erroneous. And it stands to reason that the lowest estimates are the least reliable.
First, we have a long-term pattern according to which, even within the lowest estimates, the Muslim population increase is accelerating. One explanation is that the previous low estimates were inaccurate.
Second, low estimates tend to focus on the global French population on one hand and on the global French Muslim population on the other hand, and to bypass a generational factor. The younger the population cohorts, the higher the proportion of Muslims. This is reflected in colloquial French by the widespread metonymical substitution of the word "jeune" (youth) for "jeune issu de l'immigration" (immigrant youth), or "jeune issu de la diversité" (non-European or non-Caucasian youth).
According to the first ethnic-related surveys released in early 2010, fully a fifth of French citizens or residents under twenty-four were Muslims.
Proportions were even higher in some places: 50% of the youth were estimated to be Muslim in the département (county) of Seine-Saint-Denis in the northern suburbs of Paris, or in the Lille conurbation in Northern France. A more recent survey validates these numbers.
Once proven wrong, deniers do not make amends. They move straight from fantasy to surrender.
An investigation of the French youths' religious beliefs was conducted last spring by Ipsos. It surveyed nine thousand high school pupils in their teens on behalf of the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Sciences Po Grenoble.
The data was released on February 4, 2016, by L'Obs, France's leading liberal newsmagazine. Here are its findings:
38.8% of French youths do not identify with a religion.
33.2% describe themselves as Christian.
25.5% call themselves Muslim.
1.6% identify as Jewish.
Only 40% of the young non-Muslim believers (and 22% of the Catholics) describe religion as "something important or very important."
But 83% of young Muslims agree with that statement.
Such figures should deal the death blow to demographic deniers. Except that once proven wrong, deniers do not make amends. Rather, they contend that since there is after all a demographic, ethnic, and religious revolution, it should be welcomed as a good and positive thing. Straight from fantasy to surrender.
Michel Gurfinkiel, a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum, is the founder and president of the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute, a conservative think tank in France.
Gepubliceerd op 8 nov. 2015
Ohio State University history Professor Robert Davis describes the White Slave Trade as minimized by most modern historians in his book Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast and Italy, 1500–1800 (Palgrave Macmillan). Davis estimates that 1 million to 1.25 million white Christian Europeans were enslaved in North Africa, from the beginning of the 16th century to the middle of the 18th, by slave traders from Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli alone (these numbers do not include the European people which were enslaved by Morocco and by other raiders and traders of the Mediterranean Sea coast), 16th- and 17th-century customs statistics suggest that Istanbul's additional slave import from the Black Sea may have totaled around 2.5 million from 1450 to 1700. The markets declined after the loss of the Barbary Wars and finally ended in the 1830s, when the region was conquered by France.
Hundreds of thousands of Europeans were captured by Barbary pirates and sold as slaves in North Africa and the Ottoman Empire between the 16th and 19th centuries. These slave raids were conducted largely by Arabs and Berbers rather than Ottoman Turks. However, during the height of the Barbary slave trade in the 16th and 17th centuries, the Barbary states were subject to Ottoman jurisdiction and ruled by Ottoman pashas. Furthermore, many slaves captured by the Barbary corsairs were sold eastward into Ottoman territories before, during, and after Barbary's period of Ottoman rule.
The Barbary Muslim pirates kidnapped Europeans from ships in North Africa’s coastal waters (Barbary Coast). They also attacked and pillaged the Atlantic coastal fishing villages and town in Europe, enslaving the inhabitants. Villages and towns on the coast of Italy, Spain, Portugal and France were the hardest hit. Muslim slave-raiders also seized people as far afield as Britain, Ireland and Iceland.
In 1544, the island of Ischia off Naples was ransacked, taking 4,000 inhabitants prisoners, while some 9,000 inhabitants of Lipari Island off the north coast of Sicily were enslaved.870 Turgut Reis, a Turkish pirate chief, ransacked the coastal settlements of Granada (Spain) in 1663 and carried away 4,000 people as slaves. In 1625, Barbary pirates captured the Lund Island in the Bristol Channel and planted the standard of Islam. From this base, they went ransacking and pillaging surrounding villages and towns, causing a stunning spectacle of mayhem, slaughter and plunder. According to Milton, ‘Day after day, they struck at unarmed fishing communities, seizing the inhabitants, and burning their homes. By the end of the dreadful summer of 1625, the mayor of Plymouth reckoned that 1,000 skiffs had been destroyed and similar number of villagers carried off into slavery.’871 Between 1609 and 1616, the Barbary pirates ‘captured a staggering 466 English trading ships.’
In 1627, Pirates went on a pillaging and enslaving campaign to Iceland. After dropping anchor at Reykjavik, his forces ransacked the town and returned with 400 men, women and children and sold them in Algiers. In 1631, he made a voyage with a brigand of 200 pirates to the coast of Southern Ireland and ransacked and pillaged the village of Baltimore, carrying away 237 men, women and children to Algiers.
The barbaric slave-raiding activities of the Muslim pirates had a telling effect on Europe. France, England, and Spain lost thousands of ships, devastating to their sea-borne trade. Long stretches of the coast in Spain and Italy were almost completely abandoned by their inhabitants until the nineteenth century. The finishing industry was virtually devastated.
Paul Baepler’s White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives lists a collection of essays by nine American captives held in North Africa. According to his book, there were more than 20,000 white Christian slaves by 1620 in Algiers alone; their number swelled to more than 30,000 men and 2,000 women by the 1630s. There were a minimum of 25,000 white slaves at any time in Sultan Moulay Ismail’s palace, records Ahmed ez-Zayyani; Algiers maintained a population of 25,000 white slaves between 1550 and 1730, and their numbers could double at certain times. During the same period, Tunis and Tripoli each maintained a white slave population of about 7,500. The Barbary pirates enslaved some 5,000 Europeans annually over a period of nearly three centuries.
The compensation of Britain’s 46,000 slave owners was the largest bailout in British history until the bailout of the banks in 2009. Not only did the slaves receive nothing, under another clause of the act they were compelled to provide 45 hours of unpaid labour each week for their former masters, for a further four years after their supposed liberation. In effect, the enslaved paid part of the bill for their own manumission.
Note LT: Note that Charlotte and Denis Plimmer, Slavery, The Anglo-American Involvement commented on these matters in 1973 (see our booknumber 23604). But we tend to forget willingly the disturbing tragedies of our history. Fact is that the rich always find ways to avoid losses or to be compensated for them by the state (the taxpayer). Historians should move ahead to indicate the redundant strategies and tactics of tax evasion and profitary by the upper class.
Darin werden insbesondere Vergewaltigungen durch westliche Alliierte thematisiert, wodurch das Werk eine kontroverse Debatte auslöste. Gebhardt fordert unter anderem, Vergewaltigungen nach Kriegsende stärker aufzuarbeiten.Rezensenten lobten, Gebhardt habe eine „Stärkung der Empathiekompetenz der Öffentlichkeit“ zum Ziel.
Miriam Gebhardt (* 28. Januar 1962 in Freiburg) ist eine deutsche Historikerin, Autorin und Journalistin.
Comment in English:
A million women were raped by Allied soldiers in Germany in the immediate aftermath of World War II, a new books claims.
‘When The Soldiers Came,’ by historian Miriam Gebhardt, is hailed as the definitive account of the treatment meted out to the defeated women of Nazi Germany which they remained silent about for decades out of shame and humiliaton.
‘At the very least 860,000 women and girls – and also men and young boys – were raped by the occupying Allied soldiers and their helpers. It happened everywhere,’ begins the book.
Until now it was widely thought that only the Red Army, which advanced on Germany with rape as a weapon sanctioned by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, committed the mass rapes upon tens of thousands of women, many of whom committed suicide.
‘Soldiers of the western Allies were also guilty,’ said Mrs. Gebhardt, a renowned historian in Germany who tracked down some victims to interview them about their ordeal at the hands of British and American soldiers.
‘I researched the book for over a year and-a-half,’ she said. ‘I wanted to tell the story of what ‘happened from the perspective of the victims. I wanted to reconstruct the crimes as gently as I could.’
She said the ‘terrible crimes’ did not only take place in the Soviet zones of occupation – long chronicled and well-known about – but also in French, British and American sectors.
A familiar slogan of the times was: ‘It took six years for the Americans to struggle against the German armies but it only took a day and a slab of chocolate for them to conquer German women.’
But not all collaboration in the bedroom was voluntary, writes Gebhardt.
She said the false impression grew up after the war that German women gave themselves to western soldiers because they brought with them things they desperately needed – nylons, food, cigarettes, coffee.
‘The impression grew that there was no rape in the west but rather a kind of prostitution grew up,’ said the author.
But in fact countless women were raped, she said, with soldiers believing they could treat them as they wanted after bearing coveted gifts.
‘Post-war society was hardly ready to differentiate between voluntary and forced sexual contact.
‘Between women who prostituted themselves out of emergency needs and those who had become victims of rape.’
Added to the trauma of the western victims was the shame suffered by the children they bore from their attackers.
‘Their fathers were, mostly, unknown, and the women received no financial help at all,’ said Gebhardt.
She said in parts of southern Germany, occupied by American troops, there were often ‘free nights’ where soldiers were encouraged to abuse women at will for up to 48 hours at a time.
The alleged victims are ‘relieved’ their hardship is coming to light, she added.
Source Credits: Allan Hall in the Daily Mail from Berlin.
In this luminous portrait of Paris, celebrated historian Alistair Horne gives us the history, culture, disasters, and triumphs of one of the world’s truly great cities. Horne makes plain that while Paris may be many things, it is never boring.
From the rise of Philippe Auguste through the reigns of Henry IV and Louis XIV (who abandoned Paris for Versailles); Napoleon’s rise and fall; Baron Haussmann’s rebuilding of Paris (at the cost of much of the medieval city); the Belle Epoque and the Great War that brought it to an end; the Nazi Occupation, the Liberation, and the postwar period dominated by de Gaulle--Horne brings the city’s highs and lows, savagery and sophistication, and heroes and villains splendidly to life. With a keen eye for the telling anecdote and pivotal moment, he portrays an array of vivid incidents to show us how Paris endures through each age, is altered but always emerges more brilliant and beautiful than ever. The Seven Ages of Paris is a great historian’s tribute to a city he loves and has spent a lifetime learning to know.
ARABS & ISRAEL FOR BEGINNERS, by Ron David
Illustrated by Susan David
Writers and Readers Publishing, Inc.
New York, 1993. 210 pp.
Ron David begins Arabs and Israel for Beginners by explaining that he wants to let the reader know "where his book is heading. That way, if you consider it despicable, you can leave it in the bookstore." David's embattled stance is understandable because his book challenges the popular, pro-Israeli version of the Israeli-Arab conflict. In his view, the Palestinian Arabs, who had populated Palestine for many generations before the Jewish settlers began to arrive in the tens of thousands in the late nineteenth century, were robbed of their country by the successful Zionist effort to create a Jewish state there. Ron David's book is an attempt to tell the "real" story of the struggle for Palestine stripped of Zionist mythology which misrepresents the essential elements of how the Pales tinians lost their land.
In his review of the history of the Middle East, the author reminds us that the name "Israel" comes from Genesis in the Old Testament when Jacob changed his name to Israel after fighting with an angel and that from Jacob's twelve sons came the twelve tribes of Israel. He explains that the name Canaan, meaning "land of purple" came from the precious purple dyes that were traded in the Mediterrane an coastal plain. The author suggests an explanation for the biblical story that the Jews spent forty years in the desert after escaping from Egypt. When Moses sent spies out to the land of Canaan "their report was discouraging: 'It's full of people.'" So the Jews waited in the desert until they were strong enough militarily to conquer the native inhabitants.
The author presents a useful "Summary of Jewish Countries in the Middle East" detailing the Jewish Kingdoms from 1020 BC to 586 BC. By 6 A.D., however, the author writes, the Romans made Judah a Rom an province and although "there were a couple last gasps of Jewish revolt -- Masada and Bar Kokhba ... the Jews and the ancient Middle East had had enough of each other."
Perhaps for reasons of space -- or perhaps such a task is too complicated for the purposes of this book -- Ron David decided not to provide a similar chart of Jewish habitation in the Middle East after the fall of the Jewish kingdoms and the fall of the second temple in 70 A.D. Such a chart might have been useful if only in order to give the reader a better idea of the strength of present Jewish claims to the area.
Ron David makes a point of covering Islam in some depth. The well established Arab / Bedouin code of virtue, the muruwwah, is explained. We learn that Muhammad's inspiration came from his understanding that the wealthy and powerful merchant class were ignoring their duty to the poor, an essential tenet of the muruwwah. Perhaps because of Islam's dramatic appeal to the masses, barely a century a fter the death of Mohammad in 632, "Muslims controlled an empire that stretched from Spain to the borders of China and the Arabs were entering a Golden Age."
Some of the examples of the flowering of Arab civilization in literature, psychology, science, medicine and mathematics are detailed. It is also emphasized that Islam (which means surrender to God) nurtured and was nurtured by the cultures it embraced, especially Jewish culture. "Teaching the knowledge-hungry Muslims got the Jewish scholars' creative juices flowing. The result was a Jewish Golden Age, especially in Spain, during which doctors, poets, and scholars combined secular and religious knowledge in a way that has never been achieved since."
As Ron David tells it, the Crusades (1096 - 1270) and then the Mongol invasions (1218 - 1258) brought an end to the zenith of Arab culture. After 200 years of fighting "in their own backyards, the Arabs were all used up." At the same time, the author emphasizes the irony that "the knowledge that [the Crusaders] got from the Arabs helped them break out of the brain - dead Middle Ages into the Renaissance ..."
A crucial section of the book is devoted to the events leading up to the emergence of the State of Israel in 1948. This momentous event, a huge victory for world Jewry, is at the same time for Palestinians, al-Nakbah, the catastrophe.
THE OTTOMAN LAND CODE
The new Ottoman land code of 1850 over time led to the removal of the Palestinian peasants from their land. Previously Palestinian peasants could live on and cultivate their land and pass it on to their heirs. The new land law changed that and as a result, through land purchases, often from absentee Arab landlords in Beirut, Jewish settlers began to move Palestinian peasants off the land that they had farmed for generations.
Note Lucas Tessens (201602020): This is a difficult matter in Ron David's exposé but it is key and needs more attention than it gets: If the Jews really bought the land, the Arabs no longer owned it in a legal sense. If the French buy half of Belgium they become the legal owners. In my view it is the inequality in purchasing power that leads to desinheritance of the land and the expulsion of their former tenants/farmers. Refusing to accept this process is in fact rejecting the whole capitalist system. Or should land be excluded from the list of goods that can be bought? If the answer is 'YES' then you are in a new system.
The expulsion of Palestinian farmers by the Jewish settlers frequently led to confrontations between the two sides as early as the last decade of the 19th century. The fierce rioting of 1929 in which there were hundreds of casualties on both sides resulted in a new British policy statement in late 1930 which was meant to restrict Jewish immigration and land purchases. If the new policy had held for the long term, the Palestinians might not have lost their country. However, in only a few months, the Zionists in England were powerful enough to cause the British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, to rescind the new policy statement and revert back to the pro-Jewish policies of the Balfour Declaration (1917) which stated that the British government would "view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people ... "
The advent of Hitler in 1933 and the pro-Jewish immigration policies of the British led to the Arab revolt of 1936 - 1939. Afterwards, when the British tried to redress the balance in favor of the Arabs it became the turn of the Jews to rebel and their successful terrorist actions played a key role in forcing the British to give up their mandate in Palestine in favor of the U.N.
THE U.N. PARTITION RESOLUTION
The U.N. Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, recommended the division of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state. While the Jews hailed it as a major breakthrough, the Arabs rejected it because it gave much of what was theirs to the Jews. The Jewish community in Palestine which at that time made up about a third of the population and held less than 7% of the land, were "given" more than 50% of the area of Palestine, including prime Arab farmland in the Galilee and on the Mediterranean coast and elsewhere. Equally important, the U.N. scheme placed hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs in areas that were to be controlled by the Jews. This would mean that there would be about 500,000 Arabs in a state of about 650,000 Jews -- a plan that both sides, in effect, rejected.
It is widely believed that the war between the Arabs and the Jews began with the Arab invasion on May 15, 1948, immediately after the Jews declared their state. In reality, the war actually began after the U.N. Partition Resolution, in December 1947. In this communal war the much better organized and equipped Jews captured the areas that the British were evacuating. As Israeli historian Simha F lapan writes, so successful were the Jewish forces that by the beginning of May 1948, they held most of the territory that was designated for their state by the U.N. Resolution.
The success of the Jewish campaign against the Palestinian forces may be gauged by the 300,000 Arab refugees who were forced to flee their homeland before the middle of May 1948. The situation was such an international scandal -- comparable to the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia -- that the U.S. and other countries actually entertained plans to substitute a trusteeship for Palestine rather than allow the U.N. Partition Resolution to stand. In the event, the Truman administration, with its eye on the Jewish lobby at home, withdrew its objections and was quick to recognize the new Jewish state.
When the Jewish leaders declared their new state on May 14, 1948, there were still about 400,000 Palestinians in areas that became Israel. Ben Gurion's government decided to risk war because they wished to increase their territorial gains and to cleanse the area of more Palestinians. Viewed in the light of Jewish military victories, the Arab invasion of May 15, becomes not, as pictured by the Zionists, an attempt by implacable enemy forces to drive the Jews into the sea, but rather, in large part, a pan-Arab effort to stave off further Jewish gains in Palestine and to stem the flow of even more Palestinian refugees.
Moreover, in Zionist mythology, no credit is given to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt for sheltering and sustaining the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees. Indeed Zionists frequently say that the Arab countries created and maintained the Palestinian refugee problem as a way of scoring propaganda points against Israel. It turns out that the opposite is the case. In Michael Palumbo's The Palestinian Catastrophe: The 1948 Expulsion of a People From Their Homeland (1987), evidence is presented which indicates that Ben-Gurion flatly rejected proposals by the U.S. and Syria to permanently resettle hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees. Palumbo thinks that Ben-Gurion's motivation was the idea that "as long as the refugee problem remained unsolved there would be tensions in the region which could eventually be used to ignite a new war of conquest."
Palumbo points to the territory that Israel conquered in 1967 in Palestine, Jordan, and Syria as evidence of Israel's expansionist program. Ron David's section on Lebanon provides more support to Palumbo's thesis as well as it adds perspective on Israel's control of its self-designated "security zone" in Southern Lebanon which it has held illegally since 1982. Ron David cites evidence from the diaries of Moshe Sharett, Israel's second Prime Minister, that as early as the 1950s, Israel was planning to destabilize Lebanon by pitting the Moslem community against the Lebanese Christians. The idea was to create a puppet state there so that Israel could control the land and water resources in the south.
In view of Zionist responsibility for the carnage and instability in the Middle East for much of this century, it's understandable that Ron David should raise the question at the end of his book of the billions of dollars in aid that the U.S. gives Israel every year. The author quotes an article by Jeffrey Blankfort in Lies of Our Times, pointing out how secretive our own media is on the issue of U.S. aid to Israel. "February 1989," Blankfort writes, "was the last time the New York Times ran a story describing Congress' role in approving aid to Israel." In a wonderful quote, Ron David writes, "I would rather flush that money down the toilet than give it to Israel.... At least when you flush money down the toilet, it doesn't hurt anybody."
Arabs and Israel for Beginners, one of a series of "documentary comic books," with its format of illustrations on every page, is easy to read and is highly recommended for those interested in a controversial and more objective point of view. Unfortunately, it is marred by a score or more of typos, frequent use of street language, and some mistakes: the 35,000 Arabs that Ron David says were expelled in the '56 war is silently corrected two pages later to 3,000 to 5,000; and "Eretz Yisrael" means not only, as Ron David has it, the biblical land of Israel but also the modern state of Israel . However, these lapses are a small price to pay for an extremely important book which challenges old assumptions on an issue that may be with us for generations despite the promise of the Oslo Accords.
- Das Buch 'De Tribus Impostoribus' (Von den drei Betrügern) (proefschrift - 1926)
- 'Anatole France en de geschiedenis'. In: Historische opstellen, opgedragen aan prof. dr. H. Brugmans (1929), p. 234–255. Ook in: J. Presser, Schrijfsels en schrifturen (1961), p. 7–28.
- 'Het antisemitisme als historisch verschijnsel'. In: Antisemitisme en Jodendom. Een bundel studies over een actueel vraagstuk onder redactie van Dr. H. J. Pos (1939), p. 1–18. Herdrukt in: J. Presser, Schrijfsels en schrifturen (1961), p. 29–48.
- De Tachtigjarige Oorlog (1941 - onder eigen naam 1948; 6de druk 1978)
- Napoleon. Historie en legende (1946; 7de druk 1978). Duitstalige uitgaven onder de titel Napoleon. Das Leben und die Legende (1977, 1979, 1990, 1997)
- 'Beeldbaarheid en beeldvorming in de jongste Amerikaanse historie' (Openbare les. Universiteit van Amsterdam, 11 februari 1947). Ook in: Schrijfsels en schrifturen (1961), p. 54–74.
- Amerika. Van kolonie tot wereldmacht (1949; 4de, herziene druk 1976, met een Naschrift over de periode na 1965 door dr. R. Kroes.): een vaak bijtende analyse van de Amerikaanse samenleving en de imperialistische tendenzen.
- Historia hodierna (Inaugurele rede. Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2 oktober 1950). Ook in: Uit het werk van dr. J. Presser (1969), p. 209–225.
- Gewiekte wielen. Richard Arkwright (1951)
- Schrijfsels en schrifturen (1961)
- Antwoord aan het kwaad. Getuigenissen 1939–1945, samengesteld door prof. dr. J. Presser (1961)
Europa in een boek (1963)
- Ondergang: De vervolging en verdelging van het Nederlandse Jodendom 1940-1945 (twee delen - 1965; 8ste druk 1985). Engelstalige uitgaven onder de titel Ashes in the Wind. The destruction of Dutch Jewry (Britse editie, 1968, herdruk 2010, met een nawoord van dr. Dienke Hondius; Amerikaanse heruitgave 1988) en The Destruction of the Dutch Jews (Amerikaanse uitgave 1969)
- Uit het werk van dr. J. Presser (1969; afscheidsbundel met 32 essays van zijn hand)
Gesprekken met Jacques Presser (1972; een egodocument in de vorm van de volledige tekst van de gesprekken die Philo Bregstein in 1969-1970 met Presser voerde ter voorbereiding van de documentaire film Dingen die niet voorbijgaan)
- Louter verwachting. Autobiografische schets 1899-1919 (1985; met de tekst van zijn rede voor de herdenking van 25 jaar bevrijding, 5 mei 1970, en een bibliografie van al zijn werk)