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Franse banken en belastingparadijzen: een studie. 1/3de van de winst wordt versluisd.
Edited: 201603161442
De vijf Franse banken zijn: BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Agricole, BPCE en Crédit Mutuel-CIC.
De belastingparadijzen (of landen waar grote belastingvoordelen te halen zijn): België, Luxemburg, Nederland, Jersey (UK), Monaco, Hongarije, Libanon, V.A.E., Maleisië, Hongkong, Vanuatu, Kaaimaneilanden, Bahama's, Bermuda, Singapore, Malta, Guernsey (UK), Letland, Curaçao, Cyprus, Mauritius.
Are the taxes paid now in Katanga?
Edited: 201411120212
Democratic Republic of Congo is owed an estimated $3.7 billion in unpaid customs duties and fines by companies operating in its copper-rich Katanga province between 2008 and 2013, according to an unpublished report commissioned by the public prosecutor's office. (Reuters, 20140130) The report is disputed by the mine owners. Congo's budget is expected to be $8.2 billion in 2014.
documentaire over wreedheden Leopold II in Congo
Edited: 200402244573
King Leopold's legacy of DR Congo violence

Mark Dummett

Former BBC Kinshasa correspondent

Of the Europeans who scrambled for control of Africa at the end of the 19th century, Belgium's King Leopold II left arguably the largest and most horrid legacy of all.

King Leopold II left arguably the largest and most horrid legacy

While the Great Powers competed for territory elsewhere, the king of one of Europe's smallest countries carved his own private colony out of 100km2 of Central African rainforest.

He claimed he was doing it to protect the "natives" from Arab slavers, and to open the heart of Africa to Christian missionaries, and Western capitalists.

Instead, as the makers of BBC Four documentary White King, Red Rubber, Black Death powerfully argue, the king unleashed new horrors on the African continent.

Torment and rape

He turned his "Congo Free State" into a massive labour camp, made a fortune for himself from the harvest of its wild rubber, and contributed in a large way to the death of perhaps 10 million innocent people.

I was so moved, Your Excellency, by the people's stories that I took the liberty of promising them that in future you will only kill them for crimes they commit

John Harris

Missionary in Baringa

What is now called the Democratic Republic of Congo has clearly never recovered.

"Legalized robbery enforced by violence", as Leopold's reign was described at the time, has remained, more or less, the template by which Congo's rulers have governed ever since.

Meanwhile Congo's soldiers have never moved away from the role allocated to them by Leopold - as a force to coerce, torment and rape an unarmed civilian population.

Chopping hands

As the BBC's reporter in DR Congo, I covered stories that were loud echoes of what was happening 100 years earlier.

Men who failed to bring enough rubber for agents were killed

The film opens with the shocking images of some of Leopold's victims - children and adults whose right hands had been hacked off by his agents.

They needed these to prove to their superiors that they had not been "wasting" their bullets on animals.

This rule was seldom observed as soldiers kept shooting monkeys and then later chopping off human hands to provide their alibis.

'Foreign correspondents'

Director Peter Bate uses documented accounts of such atrocities to present an imaginary court case against the monarch who he compares to a subsequent European tyrant, Adolf Hitler.

He has an actor play the bearded, heavily-set Leopold, fidgeting nervously as damning testimonies are read out, compiled by the foreign correspondents of the day, the missionaries.

John Harris of Baringa, for example, was so shocked by what he had come across that he felt moved to write a letter to Leopold's chief agent in the Congo.

"I have just returned from a journey inland to the village of Insongo Mboyo. The abject misery and utter abandon is positively indescribable. I was so moved, Your Excellency, by the people's stories that I took the liberty of promising them that in future you will only kill them for crimes they commit."

Positive legacy

In the film's most powerful sequences we see reconstructions of the terror caused by Leopold's enforcers and agents.

We see a village burnt without warning and its people rounded up; its men sent off into the forests, and its women tied up as hostages and helpless targets of abuse until their husbands return with enough wild rubber to satisfy the agent.

This, we are told, was the "moment of truth" for the whole community.

If the men did not bring back enough and the agent lost his commission, he would order the deaths of everyone.

Children and adults had their hands chopped off

There is no doubt that Congo's history, and White King, Red Rubber, Black Death are almost too upsetting to bear, however Leopold did leave, albeit unwittingly, one positive legacy - the birth of modern humanitarianism.

The campaign to reveal the truth behind Leopold's "secret society of murderers," led by diplomat Roger Casement, and a former shipping clerk ED Morel, became the first mass human rights movement.

Its successors like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Kinshasa-based Voix des Sans Voix and Journaliste En Danger mean abuses in modern day DR Congo can never be hidden for long.

Congo: White king, red rubber, black death will be shown on BBC Four in the UK on Tuesday, 24 February at 2100 (20040402)
1998: boek relaties USA-Belgium: United States Relations with Belgium and the Congo, 1940–1960
Edited: 199800003755
Jonathan E. Helmreich. United States Relations with Belgium and the Congo, 1940–1960. Newark: University of Delaware Press. Associated University Presses, London. 1998. Pp. 289. $43.50.

Although my own interest in this particular study stems more from concern for politics in the Congo than from any sustained involvement in bilateral diplomacy between the United States and Belgium, I nevertheless discovered here much useful background information. Jonathan E. Helmreich's work is a study of the high-level bilateral diplomatic negotiations between the two states during the twenty years between 1940 and 1960. Unfortunately, however, this diplomatic focus does not provide readers with a broadly based study of political, cultural, and economic interactions between the United States and Belgium. At its best, this is a competent diplomatic history; at worst, it is a frustrating exercise that confronts readers with some of the limitations of classic diplomatic history.

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH BELGIUM AND THE CONGO, 1940–1960, Jonathan E. Helmreich. This comprehensive study of United States-Belgo diplomatic ties focuses on the small power-superpower relationship and the Congo's effect upon it. Consideration is given to the U.S. purchase of Congolese uranium and the fairness of the compensation paid, Belgium's assistance to U.S. efforts to encourage European integration, and the coming of independence in the Congo. Belgium's participation in NATO, trade of Congo goods, and American policy toward UN action in the Congo are also discussed.

653-9 $43.50
juli 1960: UM geeft 1,250 miljard BEF aan Tshombe (Katanga)
Edited: 196007127721
Datum is benaderend.

De Witte L., 1996: 79

Bevestigd in Verslag Lumumbacommissie, Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 20011116, blz. 521

zie ook 23/12/1960

UMHK = Union Minière du Haut-Katanga

Bron: De Witte, 1996: 79 ("prompt na de afkondiging van de secessie")

zie ook: GIBBS D. (1991), The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis. By David N. Gibbs. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 322 pp., $???.

The United States and the Congo Crisis

Gibbs' story revolves around the competition between Belgium and American business interests over access to the Congo's rich copper resources. Although Belgium reluctantly granted independence to the Congo in 1960, Belgian investors, led by the mining company Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK), sought to preserve their profitable political and economic influence in the former colony. These interests were opposed not only by Congolese nationalists, but also by competing U.S. firms, who hoped to displace Belgian investors and win mining rights in the Congo. Over time, these American investors secured increasing support from the U.S. government. Eventually, U.S. business interests succeeded in reducing Belgian influence and gaining a dominant position in the Congo's mining industry.

Gibbsí account moves through four phases. Shortly after the Congo achieved independence, the new government was confronted with a successionist movement centered in the copper-rich Katanga province. The Katangan successionists were supported by UMHK, which supplied the Katangan government with eighty percent of its revenues and organized a mercenary force to help Katanga in its confrontation with the central government. UMHK sought to insure its interests against possible interference by the Congo's nationalist president, Patrice Lumumba.

The Eisenhower Administration supported the Katanga succession. The U.S. backed the intervention of U.N. forces which, initially, leaned in favor of the Katangan separatists. The CIA assisted in a successful coup by Congolese military officers to overthrow Lumumba's government. Gibbs attributes the Eisenhower Administration's attitude to ties between a number of key U.S. officials and Belgian business interests.

U.S. policy shifted sharply during the Kennedy years. After some vacillation, the U.S. weighed in on the side of the central government and encouraged the U.N. to turn its forces against the Katangan separatists. The rebellion was finally crushed in 1963. The Kennedy period witnessed considerable conflict among U.S. business interests. A pro-Katangan bloc with ties to UMHK managed to win support in the congress and made some inroads into the executive branch. Yet a larger bloc of anti-Katangan business interests with more extensive ties to many of Kennedy's top advisers ultimately came to exert decisive influence on U.S. policy.

During the third phase, the Congo's weak central government was plagued by multiple leftist insurgencies. Faced with the prospect of radical forces gaining power, Western governments and business interests united around a policy of military and covert intervention to stamp out leftist rebellion in the period from 1963 to 1965.

Friction arose again in 1965, however, when U.S.-supported General Joseph Mobutu took power in another coup de etat. Mobutu, in close consultation with U.S. business interests, moved to nationalize UMHK's copper mining operations. UMHK retaliated by blocking the overseas sale of Congolese copper and sponsoring a series of mercenary rebellions against the Mobutu government. The U.S., sympathetic with Mobutu's challenge to UMHK, provided military aid to help Mobutu put down these rebellions. Although Mobutu was ultimately forced to reach a compromise with UMHK, U.S. officials intervened to insure that U.S. rather than Belgian investors were granted a lucrative mining concession to exploit untapped copper deposits in the Tenke Fungurume region. U.S. economic influence in the Congo came to surpass that of Belgium.

Gibbs succeeds in showing that contending business interests were engaged by the Congo crisis, that these interest insinuated themselves into the policy-making process and that this intervention influenced U.S. policy at various points. Still, his argument is vulnerable to at least two important criticisms.

To his credit, Gibbs compares and tests his business conflict model against six alternative approaches to explaining U.S. foreign policy. Unfortunately, however, only one of these six generates a clear prediction regarding the substance of U.S. policy in the Congo case. The other five fail to tell us whether to expect U.S. intervention in the Congo and, if so, on which side. As a result, Gibbsí theoretical comparisons are largely limited to process variables, i.e., which groups or interests should be expected to participate in policy-making. This provides a weaker basis for judging the relative merits of each model. We are left without a baseline against which to measure the contribution of a business conflict approach to explaining U.S. policy. What sort of policy should we have expected toward the Congo in the absence of business intervention? Lacking an answer to this question, it is difficult to tell what difference business pressures made to U.S. behavior.

Gibbsí argument focuses heavily on the personal ties between U.S. officials and various business interests. This helps to explain the policy preferences of individual decision-makers in several important instances. Yet some policy-makers had no ties or only weak ones to any of the contending factions. Others possessed ties to multiple firms on different sides of the contest. A few who had ties to a specific business faction adopted policy preferences contrary to the interests of that group. This leads to a messy picture. In general, Gibbsí approach confronts difficulties in moving from the explanation of individual policy preferences to those of the state as a whole.

SPAAK 1969: 241 over de secessie: "Dans quelle mesure ont-elles (les grandes sociétés, LT) été les inspiratrices des événements? Je n'ose me prononcer, mais je crois qu'elles n'ont pas été tout à fait innocentes. Elles ont, pendant plusieurs années, suivi une politique qui n'était pas celle du gouvernement. Je devais en faire l'expérience."