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Erdogan mag op Koerden-jacht in Syrië, maar dan is Turkije's economie kapot
Edited: 201910080939

En toen volgde deze tweet van Trump:"As I have stated strongly before, and just to reiterate, if Turkey does anything that I, in my great and unmatched wisdom, consider to be off limits, I will totally destroy and obliterate the Economy of Turkey (I’ve done before!). They must, with Europe and others, watch over the captured ISIS fighters and families. The U.S. has done far more than anyone could have ever expected, including the capture of 100% of the ISIS Caliphate. It is time now for others in the region, some of great wealth, to protect their own territory. THE USA IS GREAT!"

Heu ..... ? Is er een dokter in de zaal?
Metropolitan (NY) onder vuur voor tonen van Thérèse Dreaming (1938) van Balthus (1908-2001). Petitie tegen zgn. voyeuristisch doek.
Edited: 201712071210
Therese Dreaming (1938)
This work was created the year after Girl and Cat, and towards the end of the period during which he painted Therese. While this girl is in a similar pose to the earlier work, there is a heightened sense of agitation for the subject in the composition. Her eyes are closed and face turned away from the viewer. Therese's body is more defined as an adult; her legs are longer and her face and arms have shed their prepubescent extra weight. Overlapping the title's indication of dreaming, her facial expressions suggest the mixture of possible ecstatic pleasure and an uncertain, uncomfortable or even pained response to unwanted shared sensual experience.

Here, even the cat assumes a different role, no longer a would-be stalwart sentinel but now a predator, albeit a domestic one, intently and sensually lapping at the bowl at Therese's feet.

The heightening of both the sensual experience depicted and the ambivalence of its subject may hint also at the impending loss of innocence in the painter's relationship with Therese at the time of the piece's production, as the following year he ceased painting her.
Oil on canvas - Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York

meer werk van Balthus op de site van The Art Story

Willen we dan maar gelijk Lolita van Nabokov uit de rekken verwijderen ?
En moeten we nu ook Louis Paul Boon opnieuw gaan screenen ?
Alizée verbannen, misschien?
Gainsbourg opgraven?
Te gek.

In het antwoord van de Met kan ik me volledig vinden: “Moments such as this provide an opportunity for conversation, and visual art is one of the most significant means we have for reflecting on both the past and the present and encouraging the continuing evolution of existing culture through informed discussion and respect for creative expression.” (zoals gemeld door de NYT)

Over de geschiedenis van de preutsheid vindt u meer in Girls lean back everywhere.
Als preutsheid je ding is, dan voel je je misschien beter dan de rest, maar wellicht is dat niet zo en ben je gewoon zoals de anderen.
Autobiografie 'It's what I do' van fotojournaliste Lynsey Addario vertaald
Edited: 201602242337
De Arbeiderspers geeft de biografie uit onder de titel 'Dit is wat ik doe. Fotograferen in tijden van liefde en oorlog.'
Samen met drie anderen die voor de NYT werkten, zat Addario in maart 2011 gevangen bij Kadhafi-getrouwen (al lijkt me dat laatste bijkomstig want door een speling van het lot had ze bij rebellen gevangen kunnen zitten, LT).
Een fragment: 'Zijn vingers gingen traag over mijn wangen, mijn kin, mijn wenkbrauwen. Ik legde mijn gezicht in mijn schoot. Hij tilde het teder weer op en ging door met zijn strelingen. Hij streek met zijn handen door mijn haar en praatte op zachte, kalme toon tegen me; hij herhaalde steeds dezelfde paar woorden. Ik duwde mijn gezicht omlaag en negeerde zijn aanrakingen en zijn woorden. Ik verstond niet wat hij zei. 'Wat zegt hij, Anthony?' Anthony aarzelde een poos en antwoordde: 'Hij zegt dat je vanavond zult sterven.'

De horror van deze scene ligt in de ontkoppeling van de opgelegde intimiteit en de dood. De fysische integriteit van de ander is ondergeschikt aan het eenzijdige genot dat verbonden is met de aanraking van de vrouw. Een verloochening van de identiteit.

Addario fotografeerde oorlogen in Afghanistan, Irak, Soedan, Congo en Libanon. Oorlogsverslaggevers komen in een trance terecht die hen te ver doet gaan in het gevaar.

(zie ook DS Weekblad 20160220)
Jim Yardley in The New York Times Magazine
About the European Union: To many experts across Europe, this messy, opaque style of governance undermines the credibility of a European experiment intended to be a model of democracy.
Edited: 201512152358
International New York Times
Thaise drukker censureert INYT
Edited: 201512021623
De Thaise drukker vond het raadzaam een artikel over de collectieve depressie en de rampzalige economische in Thailand weg te laten.
Sinds de staatsgreep van 22 mei 2014 leeft het koninkrijk Thailand onder een militaire dictatuur, o.l.v. generaal Prayut Chan-o-cha (°1954).

lees meer over de schending van mensenrechten en censuur op de site van HRW

Het reisadvies van het Belgische ministerie van buitenlandse zaken luidt als volgt: "Sinds de staatsgreep van 22 mei 2014 wordt Thailand de facto bestuurd door het leger. Op grond van artikel 44 van de interim grondwet beschikt de eerste minister over ruime bevoegdheden om de openbare orde te handhaven en de vrijheid van meningsuiting en vereniging te beperken. Kritiek geven op de staatsgreep, het koningshuis of de regering is strafbaar. Blijf weg van samenscholingen en leef steeds de instructies van de lokale autoriteiten na. Het risico op geweld blijft bestaan."
Detachment (2011)
Edited: 201509051817

Henry Barthes: How are you to imagine anything if the images are always provided for you?
Henry Barthes: Doublethink. To deliberately believe in lies, while knowing they're false.
Henry Barthes: Examples of this in everyday life: "Oh, I need to be pretty to be happy. I need surgery to be pretty. I need to be thin, famous, fashionable." Our young men today are being told that women are whores, bitches, things to be screwed, beaten, shit on, and shamed. This is a marketing holocaust. Twenty-fours hours a day for the rest of our lives, the powers that be are hard at work dumbing us to death.
Henry Barthes: So to defend ourselves, and fight against assimilating this dullness into our thought processes, we must learn to read. To stimulate our own imagination, to cultivate our own consciousness, our own belief systems. We all need skills to defend, to preserve, our own minds.
Henry Barthes: 'Some of us believe we can make a difference. And then sometimes we wake up and realise we failed. (...)
Henry Barthes: We have such a responsability to guide our young so that they don't end up falling apart, falling by the wayside, becoming insignificant. (...)'
src: IMDb
Hobsbawn over dominantie USA in Le Monde Diplomatique
Edited: 200306144455
The US drive for world domination has no historical precedent, by

Eric Hobsbawm

America's imperial delusion

The US drive for world domination has no historical precedent

Eric Hobsbawm

Saturday June 14, 2003

The Guardian

The present world situation is unprecedented. The great global empires

of the past - such as the Spanish and notably the British - bear little

comparison with what we see today in the United States empire. A key

novelty of the US imperial project is that all other empires knew that

they were not the only ones, and none aimed at global domination. None

believed themselves invulnerable, even if they believed themselves to be

central to the world - as China did, or the Roman empire. Regional

domination was the maximum danger envisaged until the end of the cold wa

The British empire was the only one that really was global in a sense

that it operated across the entire planet. But the differences are

stark. The British empire at its peak administered one quarter of the

globe's surface. The US has never actually practised colonialism, except

briefly at the beginning of the 20th century. It operated instead with

dependent and satellite states and developed a policy of armed

intervention in these.

The British empire had a British, not a universal, purpose, although

naturally its propagandists also found more altruistic motives. So the

abolition of the slave trade was used to justify British naval power, as

human rights today are often used to justify US military power. On the

other hand the US, like revolutionary France and revolutionary Russia,

is a great power based on a universalist revolution - and therefore on

the belief that the rest of the world should follow its example, or even

that it should help liberate the rest of the world. Few things are more

dangerous than empires pursuing their own interest in the belief that

they are doing humanity a favour.

The cold war turned the US into the hegemon of the western world.

However, this was as the head of an alliance. In a way, Europe then

recognised the logic of a US world empire, whereas today the US

government is reacting to the fact that the US empire and its goals are

no longer genuinely accepted. In fact the present US policy is more

unpopular than the policy of any other US government has ever been, and

probably than that of any other great power has ever been.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left the US as the only superpower. The

sudden emergence of a ruthless, antagonistic flaunting of US power is

hard to understand, all the more so since it fits neither with

long-tested imperial policies nor the interests of the US economy. But

patently a public assertion of global supremacy by military force is

what is in the minds of the people at present dominating policymaking in


Is it likely to be successful? The world is too complicated for any

single state to dominate it. And with the exception of its superiority

in hi-tech weaponry, the US is relying on diminishing assets. Its

economy forms a diminishing share of the global economy, vulnerable in

the short as well as long term. The US empire is beyond competition on

the military side. That does not mean that it will be absolutely

decisive, just because it is decisive in localised wars.

Of course the Americans theoretically do not aim to occupy the whole

world. What they aim to do is to go to war, leave friendly governments

behind them and go home again. This will not work. In military terms,

the Iraq war was successful. But it neglected the necessities of running

the country, maintaining it, as the British did in the classic colonial

model of India. The belief that the US does not need genuine allies

among other states or genuine popular support in the countries its

military can now conquer (but not effectively administer) is fantasy.

Iraq was a country that had been defeated by the Americans and refused

to lie down. It happened to have oil, but the war was really an exercise

in showing international power. The emptiness of administration policy

is clear from the way the aims have been put forward in public relations

terms. Phrases like "axis of evil" or "the road map" are not policy

statements, but merely soundbites. Officials such as Richard Perle and

Paul Wolfowitz talk like Rambo in public, as in private. All that counts

is the overwhelming power of the US. In real terms they mean that the US

can invade anybody small enough and where they can win quickly enough.

The consequences of this for the US are going to be very dangerous.

Domestically, the real danger for a country that aims at world control

is militarisation. Internationally, the danger is the destabilising of

the world. The Middle East is far more unstable now than it was five

years ago. US policy weakens all the alternative arrangements, formal

and informal, for keeping order. In Europe it has wrecked Nato - not

much of a loss, but trying to turn it into a world military police force

for the US is a travesty. It has deliberately sabotaged the EU, and also

aims at ruining another of the great world achievements since 1945:

prosperous democratic social welfare states. The crisis over the United

Nations is less of a drama than it appears since the UN has never been

able to do more than operate marginally because of its dependence on the

security council and the US veto.

H ow is the world to confront - contain - the US? Some people, believing

that they have not the power to confront the US, prefer to join it. More

dangerous are those who hate the ideology behind the Pentagon, but

support the US project on the grounds that it will eliminate some local

and regional injustices. This may be called an imperialism of human

rights. It has been encouraged by the failure of Europe in the Balkans

in the 1990s. The division of opinion over the Iraq war showed there to

be a minority of influential intellectuals who were prepared to back US

intervention because they believed it necessary to have a force for

ordering the world's ills. There is a genuine case to be made that there

are governments so bad that their disappearance will be a net gain for

the world. But this can never justify the danger of creating a world

power that is not interested in a world it does not understand, but is

capable of intervening decisively with armed force whenever anybody does

anything that Washington do

How long the present superiority of the Americans lasts is impossible to

say. The only thing of which we can be absolutely certain is that

historically it will be a temporary phenomenon, as all other empires

have been. In the course of a lifetime we have seen the end of all the

colonial empires, the end of the so-called thousand-year empire of the

Germans, which lasted a mere 12 years, the end of the Soviet Union's

dream of world revolution.

There are internal reasons, the most immediate being that most Americans

are not interested in running the world. What they are interested in is

what happens to them in the US. The weakness of the US economy is such

that at some stage both the US government and electors will decide that

it is much more important to concentrate on the economy than to carry on

with foreign military adventures. Even by local business standards Bush

does not have an adequate economic policy for the US. And Bush's

existing international policy is not a particularly rational one for US

imperial interests - and certainly not for the interests of US

capitalism. Hence the divisions of opinion within the US government.

The key questions now are: what will the Americans do next, and how will

other countries react? Will some countries, like Britain, back anything

the US plans? Their governments must indicate that there are limits. The

most positive contribution has been made by the Turks, simply by saying

there are things they are not prepared to do, even though they know it

would pay. But the major preoccupation is that of - if not containing -

educating or re-educating the US. There was a time when the US empire

recognised limitations, or at least the desirability of behaving as

though it had limitations. This was largely because the US was afraid of

somebody else: the Soviet Union. In the absence of this kind of fear,

enlightened self-interest and education have to take over.

This is an extract of an article edited by Victoria Brittain and

published in Le Monde diplomatique's June English language edition. Eric

Hobsbawm is the author of Interesting Times, The Age of Extremes and The

Age of Empire

1991: wapenfabriek PRB bouwt nytroglycerinefabriek te Engis
Edited: 199100007812 (20031016)
Jean Cattier (1902-1990), enige zoon van Félicien Cattier, overleden. R.I.P.
Edited: 199002121588
Jean Cattier, retired chairman of the European American Bank, a European bank consortium that he helped found in 1968, died of respiratory failure on Saturday at his home in Locust Valley, L.I. He was 88 years old. Mr. Cattier was a native of Brussels who came to this country in 1926. He was a partner in the investment banking house of White, Weld & Company for more than 40 years, rising to executive committee chairman and retiring in 1973. He had also been chairman of the Belgian-American Bank and the Belgian Line and president of the Belgian American Chamber of Commerce.

In the early 1950's, Mr. Cattier was the financial chief of Marshall Plan operations in West Germany, and in World War II he served in the armies of Belgium and the United States, rising to lieutenant colonel.

Surviving are his wife, Marianne; a daughter, Suzanne Taliaferro of Manhattan; four sons, John, of Barre, Vt.; Alan, of Alexandria, Va., and Henri and Jacques, both of Locust Valley, and a granddaughter.
Herstel Benguela-spoorweg wordt onderzocht door Tractebel.
Edited: 198911134511
Ninety percent of the railroad is owned by Société Générale through a London-based subsidiary, Tanks Consolidated Investments, and 10 percent by the Angolan Government.
Robert Gilman
The Idea Of Owning Land An old notion forged by the sword is quietly undergoing a profound transformation
Edited: 198412210004
One of the articles in Living With The Land (IC#8)
Originally published in Winter 1984 on page 5
Copyright (c)1985, 1997 by Context Institute
HOWEVER NATURAL “owning” land may seem in our culture, in the long sweep of human existence, it is a fairly recent invention. Where did this notion come from? What does it really mean to “own” land? Why do we, in our culture, allow a person to draw lines in the dirt and then have almost complete control over what goes on inside those boundaries? What are the advantages, the disadvantages, and the alternatives? How might a humane and sustainable culture re-invent the “ownership” connection between people and the land?

These questions are unfamiliar (perhaps even uncomfortable) to much of our society, for our sense of “land ownership” is so deeply embedded in our fundamental cultural assumptions that we never stop to consider its implications or alternatives. Most people are at best only aware of two choices, two patterns, for land ownership – private ownership (which we associate with the industrial West) and state ownership (as in the Communist East).

Both of these patterns are full of problems and paradoxes. Private ownership enhances personal freedom (for those who are owners), but frequently leads to vast concentrations of wealth (even in the U.S., 75% of the privately held land is owned by 5% of the private landholders), and the effective denial of freedom and power to those without great wealth. State ownership muffles differences in wealth and some of the abuses of individualistic ownership, but replaces them with the often worse abuses of bureaucratic control.

Both systems treat the land as an inert resource to be exploited as fully as possible, often with little thought for the future or respect for the needs of non-human life. Both assume that land ownership goes with a kind of exclusive national sovereignty that is intimately connected to the logic of war.

In short, both systems seem to be leading us towards disaster, yet what other options are there?

The answer, fortunately, is that there are a number of promising alternatives. To understand them, however, we will need to begin by diving deeply into what ownership is and where it has come from.


Beginnings Our feelings about ownership have very deep roots. Most animal life has a sense of territory – a place to be at home and to defend. Indeed, this territoriality seems to be associated with the oldest (reptilian) part the brain (see IN CONTEXT, #6) and forms a biological basis for our sense of property. It is closely associated with our sense of security and our instinctual “fight or flight” responses, all of which gives a powerful emotional dimension to our experience of ownership. Yet this biological basis does not determine the form that territoriality takes in different cultures.

Humans, like many of our primate cousins, engage in group (as well as individual) territoriality. Tribal groups saw themselves connected to particular territories – a place that was “theirs.” Yet their attitude towards the land was very different from ours. They frequently spoke of the land as their parent or as a sacred being, on whom they were dependent and to whom they owed loyalty and service. Among the aborigines of Australia, individuals would inherit a special relationship to sacred places, but rather than “ownership,” this relationship was more like being owned by the land. This sense of responsibility extended to ancestors and future generations as well. The Ashanti of Ghana say, “Land belongs to a vast family of whom many are dead, a few are living and a countless host are still unborn.”

For most of these tribal peoples, their sense of “land ownership” involved only the right to use and to exclude people of other tribes (but usually not members of their own). If there were any private rights, these were usually subject to review by the group and would cease if the land was no longer being used. The sale of land was either not even a possibility or not permitted. As for inheritance, every person had use rights simply by membership in the group, so a growing child would not have to wait until some other individual died (or pay a special fee) to gain full access to the land.

Early Agricultural Societies Farming made the human relationship to the land more concentrated. Tilling the land, making permanent settlements, etc., all meant a greater direct investment in a particular place. Yet this did not lead immediately to our present ideas of ownership. As best as is known, early farming communities continued to experience an intimate spiritual connection to the land, and they often held land in common under the control of a village council. This pattern has remained in many peasant communities throughout the world.

It was not so much farming directly, but the larger-than- tribal societies that could be based on farming that led to major changes in attitudes towards the land. Many of the first civilizations were centered around a supposedly godlike king, and it was a natural extension to go from the tribal idea that “the land belongs to the gods” to the idea that all of the kingdom belongs to the god-king. Since the god-king was supposed to personify the whole community, this was still a form of community ownership, but now personalized. Privileges of use and control of various types were distributed to the ruling elite on the basis of custom and politics.

As time went on, land took on a new meaning for these ruling elites. It became an abstraction, a source of power and wealth, a tool for other purposes. The name of the game became conquer, hold, and extract the maximum in tribute. Just as The Parable Of The Tribes (see IN CONTEXT, #7) would suggest, the human-human struggle for power gradually came to be the dominant factor shaping the human relationship to the land. This shift from seeing the land as a sacred mother to merely a commodity required deep changes throughout these cultures such as moving the gods and sacred beings into the sky where they could conveniently be as mobile as the ever changing boundaries of these empires.

The idea of private land ownership developed as a second step – partly in reaction to the power of the sovereign and partly in response to the opportunities of a larger-than- village economy. In the god-king societies, the privileges of the nobility were often easily withdrawn at the whim of the sovereign, and the importance of politics and raw power as the basis of ownership was rarely forgotten. To guard their power, the nobility frequently pushed for greater legal/customary recognition of their land rights. In the less centralized societies and in the occasional democracies and republics of this period, private ownership also developed in response to the breakdown of village cohesiveness. In either case, private property permitted the individual to be a “little king” of his/her own lands, imitating and competing against the claims of the state.

Later Developments By the early days of Greece and Rome, community common land, state or sovereign land, and private land all had strong traditions behind them. Plato and Aristotle both discussed various mixtures of private and state ownership in ideal societies, with Aristotle upholding the value of private ownership as a means of protecting diversity. As history progressed, the “great ownership debate” has continued between the champions of private interests and the champions of the state, with the idea of community common land often praised as an ideal, but in practice being gradually squeezed out of the picture. Feudal Europe was basically a system of sovereign ownership. The rise of commerce and then industrialism shifted power to the private ownership interests of the new middle class (as in the United States). The reaction against the abuses of industrialism during the past 150 years swung some opinion back again, bringing renewed interest in state ownership (as in the Communist countries).

As important as these swings have been historically, they have added essentially nothing to our basic understanding of, or attitudes about, ownership. Throughout the whole history of civilization land has been seen as primarily a source of power, and the whole debate around ownership has been, “To what extent will the state allow the individual to build a personal power base through land ownership rights?”


But the human-human power struggle is hardly the only, or even the most important, issue in our relationship to the land. Whatever happened to the tribal concerns about caring for the land and preserving it for future generations? What about issues like justice, human empowerment and economic efficiency? How about the rights of the land itself? If we are to move forward towards a planetary/ecological age, all of these questions and issues are going to need to be integrated into our relationship to the land. To do this we will have to get out beyond the narrow circle of the ideas and arguments of the past.

We have been talking about “ownership” as if it was an obvious, clear-cut concept: either you own (control) something or you don’t. For most people (throughout history) this has been a useful approximation, and it has been the basis of the “great ownership debate.” But if you try to pin it down (as lawyers must), you will soon discover that it is not so simple. As surprising as it may seem, our legal system has developed an understanding of “owning” that is significantly different from our common ideas and has great promise as the basis for a much more appropriate human relationship to the land.

Ownership Is A Bundle Of Rights The first step is to recognize that, rather than being one thing, what we commonly call “ownership” is in fact a whole group of legal rights that can be held by some person with respect to some “property.” In the industrial West, these usually include the right to:

use (or not use);
exclude others from using;
irreversibly change;
sell, give away or bequeath;
rent or lease;
retain all rights not specifically granted to others;
retain these rights without time limit or review.
These rights are usually not absolute, for with them go certain responsibilities, such as paying taxes, being liable for suits brought against the property, and abiding by the laws of the land. If these laws include zoning laws, building codes, and environmental protection laws, you may find that your rights to use and irreversibly change are not as unlimited as you thought. Nevertheless, within a wide range you are the monarch over your property.

No One Owns Land Each of these rights can be modified independent of the others, either by law or by the granting of an easement to some other party, producing a bewildering variety of legal conditions. How much can you modify the above conditions and still call it “ownership”? To understand the answer to this, we are going to have to make a very important distinction. In spite of the way we normally talk, no one ever “owns land”..In our legal system you can only own rights to land, you can’t directly own (that is, have complete claim to) the land itself. You can’t even own all the rights since the state always retains the right of eminent domain. For example, what happens when you sell an easement to the power company so that they can run power lines across you land? They then own the rights granted in that easement, you own most of the other rights, the state owns the right of eminent domain – but no single party owns “the land.” You can carry this as far as you like, dividing the rights up among many “owners,” all of whom will have a claim on some aspect of the land.

The wonderful thing about this distinction is that it shifts the whole debate about land ownership away from the rigid state-vs.-individual, all-or-nothing battle to the much more flexible question of who (including community groups, families, etc. as well as the state and the individual) should have which rights. This shift could be as important as the major improvement in governance that came with the shift from monolithic power (as in a monarchy) to “division of powers” (as exemplified in the U.S. Constitution with its semi-independent legislative, executive and judicial branches).

Legitimate Interests How might the problems associated with exclusive ownership (either private or state) be solved by a “division of rights” approach? To answer this, we need to first consider what are the legitimate interests that need to be included in this new approach. If we are to address all the concerns appropriate for a humane sustainable culture we need to recognize that the immediate user of the land (be that a household or a business), the local community, the planetary community, future generations, and all of life, all have legitimate interests. What are these interests?

The immediate users need the freedom to be personally (or corporately) expressive, creative, and perhaps even eccentric. They need to be able to invest energy and caring into the land with reasonable security that the use of the land will not be arbitrarily taken away and that the full equity value of improvements made to the land will be available to them either through continued use or through resale should they choose to move.
The local community needs optimal use of the land within it, without having land held arbitrarily out of use by absentee landlords. It needs to be able to benefit from the equity increases in the land itself due to the overall development of the community, and it needs security that its character will not be forced to change through inappropriate land use decisions made by those outside the community or those leaving the community.
The planetary community, future generations, and all of life need sustainable use – the assurance that ecosystems and topsoil that have been developed over hundreds of thousands of years will not be casually destroyed; that the opportunities for life will be enhanced; that non-renewal resources will be used efficiently and for long term beneficial purposes. This larger community also needs meaningful recognition that the earth is our common heritage.
Is it possible to blend these various interests in a mutually supportive way, rather than seeing them locked in a power struggle? The answer, fortunately, is yes. Perhaps the best developed alternative legal form that does this is called a land trust.


A land trust is a non-governmental organization (frequently a non-profit corporation) that divides land rights between immediate users and their community. It is being used in a number of places around the world including India, Israel, Tanzania, and the United States. Of the many types of land trusts, we will focus here on three – conservation trusts, community trusts, and stewardship trusts. These will be discussed in more detail in other articles in this section, but an initial overview now will help to draw together many of the threads we have developed so far.

In a conservation land trust, the purpose is generally to preserve some aspect of the natural environment. A conservation trust may do this by the full ownership of some piece of land that it then holds as wilderness, or it may simply own “development rights” to an undeveloped piece. What are development rights? When the original owner sells or grants development rights to the conservation trust, they put an easement (a legal restriction) on the land that prevents them or any future owners from developing the land without the agreement of the conservation trust. They have let go of the right to “irreversibly change” listed above. The conservation trust then holds these rights with the intention of preventing development. The Trust For Public Land (82 Second St, San Francisco, CA 94105, 415/495-4015) helps community groups establish conservation and agricultural land trusts.

A community land trust (CLT) has as its purpose removing land from the speculative market and making it available to those who will use it for the long term benefit of the community. A CLT generally owns full title to its lands and grants long term (like 99-year) renewable leases to those who will actually use the land. Appropriate uses for the land are determined by the CLT in a process comparable to public planning or zoning. Lease fees vary from one CLT to another, but they are generally more than taxes and insurance, less than typical mortgage payments, and less than full rental cost. The lease holders have many of the use and security rights we normally associate with ownership. They own the buildings on the land and can take full benefit from improvements they make to the land. They can not, however, sell the land nor can they usually rent or lease it without the consent of the trust. The Institute For Community Economics (57 School St. Springfield, MA 01105, 413/746-8660) is one of the major support groups for the creation of community land trusts in both urban and rural settings.

The stewardship trust combines features of both the conservation trust and the CLT, and is being used now primarily by intentional communities and non-profit groups such as schools. The groups using the land (the stewards) generally pay less than in a normal CLT, but there are more definite expectations about the care and use they give to the land.

In each one of these types, the immediate users (nonhuman as well as human) have clear rights which satisfy all of their legitimate use needs. The needs of the local community are met through representation on the board of directors of the trust which can enforce general land use standards. The larger community usually has some representation on the trust’s board as well. Thus by dividing what we normally think of as ownership into “stewardship” (the users) and “trusteeship” (the trust organization), land trusts are pioneering an approach that better meets all the legitimate interests.

The system is, of course, still limited by the integrity and the attitudes of the people involved. Nor are current land trusts necessarily the model for “ownership” in a humane sustainable culture. But they show what can be done and give us a place to build from. I’ll explore more of where we might build to in a later article, but now lets turn to other perspectives and experiences with going beyond ownership.


Chaudhuri, Joyotpaul, Possession, Ownership And Access: A Jeffersonian View (Political Inquiry, Vol 1, No 1, Fall 1973).

Denman, D.R., The Place Of Property (London: Geographical Publications Ltd, 1978).

Institute For Community Economics, The Community Land Trust Handbook (Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press, 1982).

International Independence Institute, The Community Land Trust (Cambridge, MA: Center For Community Economic Development, 1972).

Macpherson, C.B., Property: Mainstream And Critical Positions (Toronto: Univ Of Toronto Press, 1978).

Schlatter, Richard, Private Property: The History Of An Idea (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1951).

Scott, William B., In Pursuit Of Happiness: American Conceptions Of Property (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).

Tully, James, A Discourse On Property: John Locke And His Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1980).

Land Rights

by John Talbot

IT WAS NOT so long ago in human history that the rights of all humans were not acknowledged, even in the democracies. Slavery was only abolished a few generations ago. In the same way that we have come to see human rights as being inherent, so we are now beginning to recognize land rights, and by land I mean all life that lives and takes its nourishment from it, as well as the soil and earth itself. Once we have understood and accepted that idea, we can truly enter into a cooperative relationship with Nature. I’m not talking about living in fear of disturbing anything or a totally “hands off nature” angry ecologist view, but simply acknowledging the right to be of land and nature, and that when we do “disturb” it we do so with sensitivity and respect, doing our best to be in harmony with what is already there.

Being in harmony, apart from being a very subjective state, may not always be possible: for example in the case of putting a house down where once there wasn’t one. But we as humans have needs too. Nature knows that and is, I believe, quite willing to accommodate us. Our responsibility is, however, to act consciously and with the attitude of respect and desire for cooperation. It is no different from respecting other people’s rights in our interactions, being courteous and sensitive to their needs and feelings. This attitude toward the land is almost universally held by aboriginal and native peoples, from the Bushman to the Native American Indians to the tribes of the South Pacific. Earth Etiquette, you might say.

Following directly from that is the principle that you cannot really buy, sell or own the land. Just as we cannot (or should not) own slaves of our own species, we would not make slaves of animals, plants or the land and nature in general. Sounds easy but I feel this represents a very profound and fundamental change in human attitudes; one that takes thought, effort and time to reprogram in ourselves.
Edited: 198412041025
Published: December 4, 1984

Edward Crankshaw, one of the most respected authors on the Soviet Union and chronicler of the Hapsburgs, died last Thursday in his native Britain after what was described as a ''long and painful illness.'' He was 75 years old and lived in Hawkhurst, in rural Kent.

His death was reported Sunday in The Observer, the British weekly for which he kept watch on the Soviet scene starting in 1947. Mr. Crankshaw, who spurned the label of ''Kremlinologist,'' was regarded as Britain's premier journalistic expert on Soviet politics.

The author of about 20 books, including three novels, Mr. Crankshaw contribued a steady flow of prefaces, essays and articles to publications in Britain and the United States, including The New York Times. In addition, he commented on Soviet affairs for the BBC.

Difficult to place politically, Mr. Crankshaw reluctantly became a Soviet specialist when The Observer asked him to take the assignment after World War II, part of which he had spent in Moscow. One of the conclusions he had reached was that Kremlin policies must be seen as something that did not start with the Bolshevik takeover in 1917, but had ancient roots. He Avoided Speculation

Thus, Mr. Crankshaw avoided speculations about absences from the Kremlin wall at anniversary parades. Instead, his basic impressions had been formed when the Russians were fighting for survival, and he took heart from Stalin's evocations of historical ''Holy Russia.''

His political testament came in a preface written this year to a selection from his writings, ''Putting Up With the Russians.''

As a conservative dedicated to the survival of European civilization, he rejected the harsh tones adopted by President Reagan and his supporters, accusing them of trying to turn the Soviet Union into a pariah. Mr. Crankshaw viewed detente with some skepticism, but he insisted on the need for co- existence.

He was the author of ''Russia Without Stalin'' in 1956, regarding the changes in everyday life in the post- Stalin era. He also wrote ''Khrushchev's Russia'' (1960) and ''Khrushchev: A Career,'' published six years later.

He then wrote the introduction for ''Khrushchev Remembers,'' a rich compilation of comments, speeches, conversations and interviews by Nikita I. Khruschev, the Kremlin leader who denounced the Stalinist terror. 'Khrushchev Himself'

Mr. Crankshaw, who also contributed copious footnotes and commentary to the Khrushchev book, helped defend the book against doubters. He said that by ''style and content'' the words were ''Khrushchev himself, quite unmistakably speaking.'' His faith in the book's authenticity has come to be shared by most others since its publication in 1970.

Though ailing for many years, Mr. Crankshaw, a slight and courtly man, continued to write even in bed whenever he was unable to move about.

His last volume published in this country was ''Bismarck'' in 1982. Writing in The New York Times Book Review, George L. Mosse called the book ''a cautionary tale about political and military power'' that sees Bismarck's ''apparent success as a failure because the Iron Chancellor exalted the amoral concept of politics into a principle.''

Edward Crankshaw was born on Jan. 3, 1909, in rural Essex. As a boy, he often visited the London magistrate's court where his father, Arthur, worked as chief clerk. He attended Bishop's Stortford College but left early - hence his claim to having been largely self- taught.

Instead, Mr. Crankshaw went to the Continent to travel, and he lived in Vienna, becoming fluent in German. His Austrian years turned out to be formative ones for his mind as he watched democracy crumble in the new Austrian republic. They also instilled him with a passion for literature and music.

From Europe, he wrote for British publications subjects ranging from twelve-tone music to books, art and the theater. But he gave up journalism to write ''Joseph Conrad: Some Aspects of the Art of the Novel,'' a study of Conrad's methods and the novelist's art in general. Another book, ''Vienna: The Image of a Culture in Decline,'' appeared in 1938. Posted to Moscow in '41

In 1936, Mr. Crankshaw was commissioned into Britain's Territorial Army. In 1941, he was posted to Moscow as an intelligence officer, and he did all he could to understand the Russians, their history, national character and government.

Having also traveled on the periphery of the Soviet Union, he was asked by The Observer to return to journalism as its Russian expert. His early books on the subject were ''Britain and Russia'' (1945), ''Russia and the Russians'' (1947) and ''Russia by Daylight'' (1951).

A well-received history was The Shadow of the Winter Palace: The Drift to Revolution, 1825-1917 which appeared in 1976. Other well-received books were ''The Fall of the House of Hapsburg'' (1963) and ''The Hapsburgs'' (1971).

Of Mr. Crankshaw's ''Maria Theresa'' (1969), Thomas Lask wrote in his review in The New York Times, ''Mr. Crankshaw has managed in what is a model of compression and judicious selection to rescue Maria Theresa from the history books and to turn a monument into a warm and appealing woman.''

Mr. Crankshaw is survived by his wife, the former Clare Chesterton Carr.
The Irish Times
Edited: 198300008521
July 18, 2017

Originally published by The Irish Times, 1983.

ON OCTOBER 20th, 1944, Norman Lewis wrote in his journal, “A year among the Italians has converted me to such an admiration for their humanity and culture that were I given the chance to be born again, Italy would be the country of my choice.” This explains why “Naples 44” gives an overall impression of beauty, dignity, mellowness, graciousness; the hallmarks of indestructible traditions serenely surviving the barbarisms of yet another war. In his journal Norman Lewis recorded every sort of brutality, corruption, chicanery, depravity and squalor. Yet he never allowed himself to be depressed by his experiences as a field security officer.

Always he remained aware of immemorial controlling rituals below the surface, of wit glinting through the most macabre and sordid “deals”, of exotic codes of honour and courage giving a bizarre—and not entirely phone—aura of respectability to the most outrageous Mafia manoeuvrings. Always, too, he responded to people as individuals; so his pages vibrate with the entries and exits of a preposterous yet wholly credible cast of happy rascals, melancholy eccentrics, lascivious noblewomen, licentious soldiery, keen-witted child-crooks and suave Black Marketeers who might be anything from senior officers of the Allied Military Government to Vatican prelates to Community Party bosses.

Of course for an ordinary decent Englishman it was all a bit confusing at times, especially as Field Security personnel were allowed an astonishing autonomy which could put them in uncommonly awkward situations. They were expected to combat corruption only in so far as it affected the operations of the Allied Armies. But often it was hard to know where to draw the line; or, indeed, whether it was would be prudent to draw any line. Towards the end of his year in the Naples area, Norman Lewis wrote sadly: I personally have been rigid when I should have been flexible. Here the police—corupt and tyrannical as they are—and the civil population play a game together, but the rules are complex and I do not understand them, and through lack of this understanding I lose respect.”

“Naples ‘44” forces us to dwell on the physical and moral dreadfulness of what is now quaintly called “convention war”, to distinguish it from that sophisticated nuclear war—all new and different and excitingly unconventional—at present being considered as a “possible option” by the Pentagon.

On September 11th, 1943, at Salerno, Norman Lewis learned that Americans of the 45th Division had been ordered to take no German prisoners and to beat to death with their rifle butts any German who tried to surrender. Mr Lewis wrote that evening: I find this almost incredible.” A fortnight later he was relieved to noticed that some of the Americans were “beginning to question the ethics of this order. One man who surrendered to a German tank crew was simply stripped of his weapons and turned loose because he could not be carried in the tank, and as a result he is naturally a propagandist for what he accepts as the general high standard of German humanity.”

As German tanks rolled towards the Allied position at Salerno, the American officers stealthily deserted, abandoning their men, who soon succumbed to total panic and “in the belief that our position had been infiltrated by German infantry began to shoot each other and there were blood-chilling screams from men hit by their own bullets … Official history will in due time set to work to dress-up this part of the action at Salerno with what dignity it can. What we saw was ineptitude and cowardice spreading down from the command, and this resulted in chaos.”

Norman Lewis also records his compatriots’ misdeeds. At Secuirty Headquarters in Salno, he saw a British officer interrogating an Italian civilian by battering his head with a chair—“a treatment which the Italian, his face a mask of blood, suffered with stoicism.” The officer then called in a private of the Hampshires and asked him, “Would you like to take this man away, and shoot him?” The private spat on his hands and replied, “I don’t mind if I do, sir.” Norman Lewis described this as “the most revolting espied I have ever seen since joining the forces.” But of course there was much worse to come.

When the French colonial troops took a town or village, they raped the entire population—old men and children as well as women of all ages. Often two Moroccans assaulted a woman simultaneously, one committing sodomy while the other had normal intercourse. Many victims suffered damage to the genitals, uterus and rectum. At Ceccano, the British had to build a guarded camp to protect the Italian from the Moors—many of whom had by then joined other deserters, from all the Allied Armies, in terrorising areas far behind the line of battle.

Norman Lewis wondered, “What is it that turns an ordinary decent Moroccan peasant into the most terrible of sexual psychopaths as soon as he becomes a soldier?” A few days later he was recording Italian vengeance: Five Moors were given food or wine containing some paralysing poison. While fully conscious they were castrated, and then beheaded. The decapitation was entrusted to pubescent boys to prove their worth, but the boys lacked both the skill and strength to carry the task out in a speedy manner.”

* * * * *

“Naples 44” frequently reminds us that modern man is the most dangerous of all animals. We who lead sheltered lives can at times delude ourselves that civilisation is winning out, that we of the 20th century are not as our forefathers were—delighting in public hangings, and all that. But once war has removed the restraints imposed by modern society, most men still behave like the hordes of Attila the Hun, whether they be Guards officers or Moroccan peasants. Where we really have advanced is in the devising of national international structures for the maintenance of laws and order. And perhaps one day, if we survive long enough, we’ll learn how to use those structures effectively, to avoid war.
NYT (27/1/1971)
25 januari 1971: baron Robert Frederic Silvercruys (Tongeren, 17/10/1893; Washington, 25/1/1971) overlijdt. R.I.P.
Edited: 197101250988
Hij speelde als Belgisch ambassadeur een grote rol in de uranium-overeenkomsten tussen België (Belgisch-Congo) en de U.S.A.

zie de scriptie over deze diplomaat
10 december 1962: John Steinbeck's speech at the Nobel Banquet at the City Hall in Stockholm.
Edited: 196212102005

"Literature was not promulgated by a pale and emasculated critical priesthood singing their litanies in empty churches - nor is it a game for the cloistered elect, the tinhorn mendicants of low calorie despair. Literature is as old as speech. It grew out of human need for it, and it has not changed except to become more needed." - Steinbeck

"Socialism never took root in America because the poor see themselves not as an exploited proletariat but as temporarily embarrassed millionaires" - Steinbeck

"Our species is the only creative species, and it has only one creative instrument, the individual mind and spirit of a man. Nothing was ever created by two men. There are no good collaborations, whether in art, in music, in poetry, in mathematics, in philosophy. Once the miracle of creation has taken place, the group can build and extend it, but the group never invents anything. The preciousness lies in the lonely mind of a man. And now the forces marshaled around the concept of the group have declared a war of extermination on that preciousness, the mind of man. By disparagement, by starvation, by repressions, forced direction, and the stunning blows of conditioning, the free, roving mind is being pursued, roped, blunted, drugged. It is a sad suicidal course our species seems to have taken. And this I believe: that the free, exploring mind of the individual human is the most valuable thing in all the world.
And this I would fight for: the freedom of the mind to take any direction it wishes, undirected. And this I must fight against: any idea, religion, or government which limits or destroys the individual. This is what I am and what I am about. I can understand why a system built on a pattern must try to destroy the free mind, for this is the one thing which can by inspection destroy such a system. Surely I can understand this, and I hate it and I will fight against it to preserve the one thing that separates us from the uncreative beasts. If the glory can be killed, we are lost."

-East of Eden 1952

"I guess this is why I hate governments. It is always the rule, the fine print, carried out by the fine print men. There's nothing to fight, no wall to hammer with frustrated fists."-Travels with Charley, 1962

"What good's an opinion if you don't know?"-Travels with Charley

"Power does not corrupt. Fear corrupts... perhaps the fear of a loss of power."

"...there is a base theme. Try to understand men, if you understand each other you will be kind to each other. Knowing a man well never leads to hate and nearly always leads to love."
bankier Alfred Loewenstein verdwijnt uit vliegtuig
Edited: 192807058825
"Tijdens de nachtvlucht van Brussel naar London verdwijnt bankier Alfred Loewenstein op mysterieuze wijze uit het vliegtuig. Zelfmoord of misdrijf? Zijn verdwijning zorgt voor opschudding in de bankwereld en verwarring op de beurs." (KVB 821 en 823)

Zie ook boek: Référence : 70462&75 B en vente à : ipb-books - Westerlo, Belgique - 0032 14 54 65 05

Privat Maurice - La vie et la mort d'Alfred Loewenstein Paris 1929 12 x 19 cm 170 pp. soft cover good / goed 7 €

cover not so good / omslag onfris, Gevouwen rug / Folded back (zie bib MERS)


NORRIS, William (1987), THE MAN WHO FELL FROM THE SKY. New York: Viking Penguin Inc. New York.

genre: General Nonfiction

The Man Who Fell from the Sky is the true story of the quest to solve the most tantalizing aviation mystery of all time -- and a vivid portrait of a high-flying international tycoon's life in the Roaring Twenties.

On July 4, 1928, a Fokker trimotor took off from London, bound for Brussels. On board were the plane's owner, Alfred Loewenstein, a financier of immense wealth and influence; a pilot and co-pilot; a valet; a male secretary; and two female stenographers. The plane never reached Brussels. Instead, it landed on the Normandy coast, where the crew told French authorities that Loewenstein had accidentally fallen from the plane into the English Channel. A hastily held inquest ruled that Loewenstein's death was probably accidental, and although the case made international headlines, there the matter stood -- until this book.

Was Alfred Loewenstein murdered? Reporter and aviation expert William Norris went on an international odyssey to establish the impossibility of Loewenstein's death being anything but murder. He has interviewed every survivor with any recollection of Loewenstein and delved in exhaustive detail into his barefaced financial manipulations -- sharp dealings that left him with ample enemies (and suspects). He has unearthed fascinating details about Loewenstein's gaudy lifestyle -- his incredible retinue, racing stable, eight villas in Biarritz, and fantastic fox-hunting weekends where the best of British society milked this Catholic/Jewish outsider for stock tips (and snubbed him everywhere else). He has traced the suspiciously prosperous lives of the Fokker's other occupants -- and established the mechanical means whereby a murder could have been committed.

The book's double-layered narrative of the life and death of Loewenstein and the author's search for the truth behind his demise involve the reader with gripping immediacy in a saga of high-rolling greed and a shocking cover-up. The Man Who Fell from the Sky is a unique true-crime story, with the tantalizing spell of the most cunning mystery fiction.

Review comments:

"A gripping murder mystery which - like all the best stories - is true." -- Robert Lacey, author of Ford: the Men and the Machine.

"An exceptionally good example of what an author can do when he puts his nose on the trail of a great murder story. Authors make great detectives. Norris is at the top of his class." -- Sydney Kirkpatrick, author of A Cast of Killers.

"A fascinating and well-researched investigation into one of the twentieth century's most intriguing mysteries" -- Robin Bruce Lockhart, author of Reilly, Ace of Spies. (20031029)


Op vonden we volgende informatie over een overledene in het concentratiekamp Sobibor:

Alfred Löwenstein - geb. 01 mei 1875, Arfeld - overl. 23 juli 1943, Sobibor - 68 jaar - J.P. Coenstraat 13

Henriette Löwenstein-Rindskopf - geb. 23 oktober 1873, Rappenau - overl. 23 juli 1943, Sobibor - 69 jaar

Is er een verband?